BYU Studies Quarterly
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-1968

What Guns, Bombs, and Lives Have Not Purchased: The
Frustration of Vietnam
Ray Cole Hillam

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq

Recommended Citation
Hillam, Ray Cole (1968) "What Guns, Bombs, and Lives Have Not Purchased: The Frustration of Vietnam,"
BYU Studies Quarterly: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol8/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Studies Quarterly by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more
information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Hillam: What Guns, Bombs, and Lives Have Not Purchased: The Frustration

guns
bombs and lives
what
have not purchased
the frustration of vietnam
RAY COLE HILLAM

not war as we have known it in the
to have our wars simple and we
think they should be for one purpose victory but the war in
vietnam defies this description
there are many different views of the war some claim it
is a civil war in which the united states and other powers are
meddling others argue that it is a war of aggression from the
north and upon request the united states is supporting the
object of that aggression the saigon government still others
see it as an expanding china which the united states and its
allies are obligated to resist there is some merit in all three
of these claims for instance not every viet cong is a communist many are nationalists who have joined for reasons other
contributed to the notion that the
than communism this has contributed
war in south vietnam is an internal or civil war however
the viet cong if successful will create a communist state
either separate from or unified with north vietnam likewise
hanoi s involvement in south vietnam including the recent
infiltration of conventional forces has become obvious to most
observers in fact now that the war has taken on certain convent
ional qualities hanoi has openly admitted its involvement
ventional
nor can it be doubted that there are certain international complications involving moscow peking and washington though
they are not in direct conflict thus the war in vietnam has
its local and international dimensions it is a war fought at

the war in vietnam is
past we americans like

many levels
article is based on the observations of professor hillam while he was
in vietnam as a fulbright hays professor from september 1966 to july
1967 it is a discussion of the nature of the war as he saw it and the
kind of challenge which confronts the newly elected south vietnamese
government and its allies
dr hillam is associate professor of political science at brigham young univer sity
versity

this
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is also a war with four quite distinct parts some stress
the conventional qualities of the war and the need to first

resist overt aggression the department of defense statement
that the covert nature of the aggression in vietnam which
characterized the earlier years of the struggle has now all
but disappeared implies that the war is now conventional
others emphasize its political qualities the need to shore up the
saigon government and broaden its base of support and to
make a decision about negotiating with hanoi with or without
the participation of the national liberation front still others
stress the importance of achieving economic stability and prosperity in order to combat inflation and famine commonly
referred to as the other war more significant say some is
the war against clandestine aggression the organizational
war against the enemy infrastructure

the objectives and strategy of the enemy
the objectives of the enemy in vietnam

give greater understanding to the nature of this different kind of multifaceted
multi faceted
war and reveal that it has a dimension in depth that traditional wars whatever their scale lack the enemy intends not
only to seize power or to exchange one government system for
another but to restructure the entire south vietnamese society
including the destruction of the prevailing myths that bind
this society together in this sense the objective is total to
achieve this objective the enemy has resorts
resortd to a war of
persuasion manipulation and compulsion as well as violence
thus the war takes on political economic social and psychological as well as military significance
the strategy of the enemy in south vietnam is based partly on a mixture of ofaphorisms
aphorisms accumulated over the years from
the writings of chinese and vietnamese revolutionaries and
partly on pragmatic assumptions of how best to come to power
in south vietnam recently captured enemy diaries and notebooks clearly indicate the emphasis the enemy places on the
writings of mao tse tung and vo nguyen giap the north
vietnamese theoretician the continual reference to the military maxims and political aphorisms of these two prominent
revolutionaries suggests the importance the enemy places on
the ideology of guerrilla communism as a directing and motiva ting factor
tivating
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in discussing the strategy of the enemy it is important to
refer to the earlier strategies of mao and giap mao in his
1938 lectures on protracted war speaks of a three phased
protracted strategy the defensive stalemate and offensive
phases giap while he generally accepts mao s three phased
strategy in his book entitled peoples war peoples army adds
two preliminary phases which provide first for the psychological milieu for the insurgency and second for the organizational base for launching the protracted war the next three
phases which tend to be operational rather than preparatory
are similar to mao s description of the three phased protracted
war
in an effort to simplify the description of the enemy s
strategy both as it is based on the mao giap formula and the
present environment perhaps it is best to speak in terms of
four phases the organizational the nonviolent the violent and
the legitimization phases
in the organizational phase the professional revolutionary
and functional cadre develop a network of clandestine organizations and lay the foundation for a comprehensive infrastructure it is also during this incipient phase that a strategy
is developed for launching organized resistance against the
constituted authorities
in the next phase which is the initial operational phase
and is best characterized by the emphasis placed on nonviolent
activities the cadre is actively engaged in political agitation
and indoctrination he organizes and directs study groups
fronts and other overt organizations designed to enlist popular
support for his clandestine movement this organizational base
both overt and covert continues to broaden during this phase
and subsequent phases of the protracted strategy
the third phase is characterized by violence there are
uerrilla attacks on outposts
kidnap pings and guerrilla
assassinations kidnappings
berrilla
police patrols or convoys initially the enemy employs defensive tactics of hit run and hide the government is in hot
pursuit but eventually becomes overextended yet tries to hold
on throughout this phase the enemy is building and consoli dating his position continued emphasis is placed on clansolidating
destine activity and organizational work political agitation and
indoctrination as well as acts of terror continue
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the final phase is one primarily of force rather than issues
the guerrilla units become mobile conventional military units
which initiate frontal assaults and attack fortified positions
the war becomes conventional and much of the ideological
emphasis is replaced by the long hoped for military victory
it is during this phase that the movement hopes to achieve
locallv and abroad
legitimacy and general acceptance locally
in the enemy s protracted strategy the transition from one
phase to the other is not precise and can be reversed and one
phase is not necessarily a prerequisite for another the chart
below illustrates the fluid nature of the enemy s phased strategy
of protracted war note that each stage while evolving into
an advanced stage continues its existence up to the end of the
conflict
FOUR PHASED
ph-

i

phase

2

protracted

WAR

aa
3a

ph

ph

A

2

CURRENT SITUAT ON

IN VIETNAM

the

war in vietnam is presently in the third and fourth
phases in fact there are expressions of all four phases in
different areas of south vietnam in the mekong delta except
for an giang province the enemy is in phase three in the
northern provinces of south vietnam he is in phase four in
an giang and tuyen due
duc provinces he has never extended
much beyond the second phase in late 1964 the enemy was
passing into the fourth phase but because of the direct and
escalated commitment of united states troops the enemy has
had to revert back to earlier phases in some areas
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present situation
certain military economic and political gains have been
made since the spring of 1965 there have been military successes against viet cong battalion size forces in such areas as
the iron triangle and against north vietnamese units in the
central highlands if current estimates are to be accepted the
enemy is gradually declining in strength these estimates indicate that while he has been recently losing around 15000 men
per month infiltration from the north has declined to about
7000 per month and recruitment in the south has declined to
approximately 5000 per month thus the allied military invement has put substantial pressure on the enemy and has
vol
volvement
made it more difficult for him to pursue his strategy
there is some evidence of an improved economic situation
the runaway inflation of a year ago has been curbed and some
of the developmental programs have achieved a measure of
success in such areas as education public works and agriculture these hopefully will improve the productivity and the
living
livina standard of the average vietnamese
there is also some evidence of political progress it is estimated that the number of people under government control
has increased by six percent during the past year nearly 450
aile
alle
hamlets were alie
allegedly
9 edly brought under the control of the saigon
government in 1966 and the current pacification program
revolutionary development seeks to extend government
control over an additional 1100 hamlets containing a popula15
tion of 13
1.3
13 million during 1967 just a year ago the thieu ky
regime was barely able to survive buddhist riots yet since that
time a constituent assembly has drafted a constitution which
was promulgated recently and free elections have been held
despite extreme viet cong terror and opposition
however there are also factors which counterbalance these
gains although some estimates indicate that the enemy may
now be beginning to decline in manpower other estimates show
that over the past two years he has been able to increase by
nearly 65000 men nearly 220000 of the enemy have been
killed yet the allies are confronted with the largest enemy force
they have ever faced 297000 men furthermore the enemy
from fighting with captured rifles and limited
has progressed
c
supplies to using automatic weapons heavy mortars artillery

the
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and rockets which have been brought into the south all these
improvements in the enemy position have been made despite
intensified pacification efforts and extensive military pressure
more than a million troops have been able to secure only a
fraction of a country slightly larger than utah
the cost of the war has been high indeed currently the
united states is pouring more than two billion dollars a month
into the war effort and is losing nearly twice the number of
men per week compared with a year ago the number of US
dead now exceeds 13000 the costs to south vietnam have
also been staggering in addition to the destruction from the
war the south vietnamese armed forces have lost more than
50000 men since 1961 the united states has committed more
than half a million men to vietnam and the south vietnamese
government expects to increase its 650000 man army by an
additional 100000 yet the enemy has been able to effectively
respond to past increases and presumably is capable of meeting
new ones
despite signs of economic and political progress in south
vietnam this progress could be abruptly reversed without
united states support almost certainly the newly elected government would rapidly collapse
in view of these conditions the present situation is one of
stalemate stalemate is an unacceptable term among officials
in washington and the higher echelons in vietnam but it is
commonly used by americans serving in vietnam to describe
the current situation
why is it that the enemy can successfully stalemate the
superior military power of the allies what is it that would
lead a senior american general to say 1 I have destroyed the
X division three times 1I have chased main force units all over
the country and the impact was zilch

the infrastructure
the strength of

the enemy position in south vietnam lies
in his organization the infrastructure the term infrastructure
is appropriate since it implies an arrangement of constituent
parts beneath the surface indeed the infrastructure is a sophisticated network of parallel horizontal and vertical intermediate structures designed to enmesh populations and retain
commitments it is this complex organization which has been
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used to mobilize and manipulate the rural population and to
prevent the saigon government from governing
the question may be properly raised as to how the infrastructure was able to gain this stronghold the roots are in its
predecessor the viet minh movement through which ho chi
minh obtained power in the north the viet minh was a
nationalistic movement of vietnamese against the french co
lonia lists ho through political and organizational genius was
lonialists
able to seize control of the movement so that it became a communist front organization not long after the geneva agreements of 1954 the enemy began to strengthen and extend the
clandestine apparatus left in the south by ho chi minh
conditions in south vietnam were conducive for waging a
clandestine war against the ngo dinh diem regime an administrative vacuum existed throughout much of south vietnam partly because diem was never able to extend effective
control over the entire nation and partly because officials in
those areas under nominal control of the diem government
preferred to govern in the traditional mandarin manner let
the peasants come to you do not go to them
the vacuum was filled by the remnants of the viet minh
infrastructure who restructured the existing apparatus recruited
and trained additional cadre and broadened their popular base
thus the infrastructure began to evolve not wholly as an indigenous clandestine revolutionary movement but one which
was partially transplanted the chart indicates the line organization of the infrastructure direction of the infrastructure is
provided by the central office for south vietnam COSVN
with headquarters in north vietnam this is a hard core communist organization with lines running into south vietnam
particularly to the people s revolutionary party PRP which
is composed of communist cadre most of whom are south
vietnamese and which is the intermediary between the leadership in the north and the movement in the south the PRP
provides the leadership for the national liberation front
NLF which like its predecessor the viet minh is a communist front organization the purpose of the NLF is to serve
as a fathering point for all opposition to the saigon government and it includes both communists and non communists
the viet cong armed units are the military forces subordinate
to the PRP
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infrastructure has three levels at the top are the dedicated north and south vietnamese communists who provide
direction for the movement in the middle are the cadre who
are perhaps more motivated by career and professional incentive than revolutionary fervor whatever their motivation
they are the backbone of the movement and provide the necessary link between the leadership and the masses the lower
level consists of the peasants who belong to mass organizations
who provide men provisions and cover for the military effort
and who are loyal to whichever government is currently in
control the rank and file are often motivated to support the
movement through grievances against the government promises
of a better future or intimidation and terror
despite the organizational genius of the enemy there are
some problems within the infrastructure first the system
favors the poor peasant over the middle class educated person
and offers him special advantages yet the latter has a tendency
to rise to positions of leadership often this results in the
resentino
unique situation of the middle class leader re
resenting
sentino
cresentino the peasant

the
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because of his special advantages and the peasant resenting the
leader because of his higher position against the background
of class struggle which the ideology of the enemy encourages
this conflict is sharpened second the rank and file often object
to an imposed system of government whether it be communist
or noncommunist
non
communist earlier the infrastructure had offered them
benevolent government lower taxes and reform but recent
military demand has made this impractical and the rank and
file often become disgruntled at unfulfilled promises and a
never ending war the leaders and cadre of the infrastructure
have frequently resorted to terror to achieve their goals and
this has further weakened their appeal third like the saigon
government the security forces and military units within the
infrastructure are not always able to provide adequate security
there is an increased tendency for the rank and file to blame
the infrastructure for not protecting them when their village
or hamlet is subjected to increasing pressure from saigon
the infrastructure has a great advantage over the government since its organization as designed thoroughly penetrates
every level of society and has been in operation for a number
of years nevertheless sometimes it is difficult to compete
with efficient government administration these weaknesses
contribute to the feasibility of limiting the power of the infrastructure

defeating the infrastructure
how can the infrastructure be rendered ineffective

the

most meaningful strategy is to dry up its resources this requires more effectively restricting the infiltration of supplies
and manpower from north vietnam and more important reducing the local sources of supplies manpower and popular
support
the current strategy of interdiction is clearly insufficient
in recent months infiltration has been so great that the enemy
has been able to escalate its military effort particularly in 1I
corps the northern provinces of south vietnam from the
third to the fourth phase bombing the access routes from
north vietnam has been of limited value enemy infiltration
has been made more difficult by military operations into the
demilitarized zone and along the laotian and cambodian bor
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der but it has not been reduced in fact it has increased because of the requirements of the enemy in the south
the apparent futility of the present strategy of interdiction
is reflected in the recent statement of the south vietnamese
defense minister general cao van vien who said that bombing in north vietnam would not in itself stop infiltration
the problems he said are the infiltration routes and base
areas the enemy has in laos and cambodia and that so long as
these problems cannot be resolved infiltration will not cease
he believes the war will last another twenty to thirty years
unless infiltration of men and supplies through laos is halted
since present military measures have not effectively curbed
the enemy s infiltration into the south some argue negotiations with hanoi is the only other alternative negotiations
while they might be desirable are no guarantee against infiltration the attitude of hanoi is to continue the effort in the
south and the central office for south vietnam has been instructed not to deviate from the orginal
ordinal goals even in the event
of negotiations with the americans
the strategy of interdiction has been of limited value
negotiations are not only presently unlikely but it is doubtful
whether infiltration would stop even if the belligerents found
themselves at the conference table some alternative methods
must be considered perhaps the construction of a fortified belt
or barrier south of the demilitarized zone should be more
seriously considered this might later be followed by building
a system of strategically situated barriers down the laotian and
cambodian borders or erecting a fortified barrier across laos to
the mekong river these barriers if properly maintained and
enforced could more successfully restrict the huge flow of
supplies and manpower and possibly dry up the infrastructure s
external source of support 1
more significant than infiltration from the north is the
availability of support to the enemy in the south the locally
recruited hamlet and village cadre who provide the necessary
link between the hard core leadership and the masses are the
backbone of the enemy infrastructure it is through these
lafter
after

this article was in galley proof secretary of defense robert
mcnamara
Mcl STamara announced that the strategy called for here would be implemented
mclstamara
however
ho weer the extent and strength of the barrier system he has in mind is not
known at this time
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middle range cadre who in many cases have their own political
base that the enemy is able to secure recruits and supplies to
carry on the war
how can the recruitment of young men in the hamlets and
the collection of food and other supplies be curbed if not
eliminated how can the enemy s resources within south vietnam be dried up the answer is pacification there have been
pacification efforts in the past but they have failed
the first pacification attempts in vietnam were made by
the french some fifteen years ago but the french were up
against impossible odds not only was the population firmly
on the side of the enemy but the armed forces of the enemy
outnumbered the french the first attempt at pacification
under ngo dinh diem was started in 1957 known as operation sunrise the effort called for the destruction of the enemy s
administrative structure and the inclusion of the countryside
under government control the villages marked for pacification
were mismanaged and ill defended many government officials
and pacification workers were assassinated or kidnapped and
the program eventually terminated leaving the areas more
firmly in the hands of the enemy
then came the ill fated strategic hamlet program patpost war
terned after the british pacification strategy in postwar
malaya this program was designed to achieve population and
resource control in selected areas by confining the rural population to fortified hamlets the image of the government was to
be built up in these fortified hamlets by intensive propaganda
and improved social services while the concept had merit
impossible goals were set for the program by the end of one
year it was claimed that approximately half of the estimated
8.2
82 million people had
12537 hamlets with a population of 82
been pacified through the program during the next year 1963
most of the remaining half were to have been pacified however the program floundered because it was rushed overextended and haphazardly carried out furthermore the diem
government was overthrown by the end of the year
by january 1964 the mistakes of the past were reviewed
and the revised strategic hamlet program became known as
the new life hamlet program in which most of the emphasis
was placed on rural construction with local militia providing
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security since the february 1966 honolulu conference the
new hamlet program has become part of a more comprehensive concept called revolutionary development RD
and
milita
military
ryand
the concept of RD is defined as an integrated militaryand
civil process to restore consolidate and expand government
buli
bull
control so that nation buil
ding can succeed it consists of
building
coordinated military and civil actions to free the people from
enemy control restore public security initiate political social
and economic development extend effective government
authority and win the support of the people even many within
the enemy s infrastructure it is designed to be a comprehensive
balanced and integrated approach to provide security and to
transform south vietnam into a free viable and enduring
society it is a recognition of the fact that neither the military
war nor the other war by itself is adequate in concept it
ties together all sides of the struggle military political ecomiddle
nomic and social As a result the marginal man middie
middle
cadre of the infrastructure becomes the most significant tar-

get

in theory RD is a sound concept in practice it has not
been moving as well as it might according to one source only
168 of 12537 rural hamlets are under total government control and fewer than 2000 are under partial control the enemy
on the other hand controls nearly 4000 hamlets
the heart of the problem is providing security many
hamlets have been under enemy control as long as twenty
years clearing the area of main force enemy units rooting out
the infrastructure and transforming the political loyalties of
the people cannot be achieved overnight past crash programs
have not been realistic for instance it was recently announced
that the khan van hamlet just miles from saigon had
been pacified again for the fifth time
unfortunately the pacification programs have always been
under constant pressure from saigon and washington to show
results this pressure often corrupts the reporting process resulting in overplayed success stories and false optimism
the program from the beginning has been plagued by the
lack of expertise in leadership and the recruitment of incompetent RD workers many of the RD teams which are sent
into the hamlets to live with the people for six months or

ra
r6
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longer for purposes of pacification have been more of a drain
on the economy and manpower pool than an asset to pacification some have deserted in mass others however have been
effective where adequate security has been maintained
the slow and disappointing beginning of the RD program
does not mean there is a need for a new program rather the
present RD program needs to be perfected specifically by
being more adaptable to the requirements of each hamlet and
to the nation as a whole moreover since RD is basic to national policy both the vietnamese effort and that of their american
advisers must be integrated RD should be a rallying point for
every military and civil effort in south vietnam unfortunately
this is not the present situation as the maze of separate and
independent programs which give only lip service to RD still
continues
conclusions
the war in vietnam is frustrating to most americans who
have served there because of its complexity protraction and
current stalemate frustration also stems from the failure of not
knowing what to do next withdrawal is virtually impossible
even if desirable continued military escalation will have little
impact on the infrastructure unless it leads to the kind of massive destruction most americans consider unthinkable
the newly elected government and its allies must focus
more on the challenge of drying up the enemy infrastructure
the current military stalemate is perhaps meaningful if the
positive trends toward constitutional government and economic
progress can continue however these trends are not assured
unless the power of the infrastructure is substantially reduced
unfortunately guns bombs and lives have purchased little
the infrastructure remains virtually unscathed
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